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A note on the Relationship between High-Frequency Trading and Latency 
Arbitrage.  
 
                                                    Abstract 
We develop three artificial stock markets populated with two types of market participants ± HFT 
scalpers and aggressive high frequency traders (HFTrs). We simulate real-life trading at the 
millisecond interval by applying Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) to real-time data from 
Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft. We observe that HFT scalpers are able to calculate NASDAQ 
NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer) at least 1.5 milliseconds ahead of the NASDAQ SIP (Security 
Information Processor), resulting in a large number of latency arbitrage opportunities. We also 
demonstrate that market efficiency is negatively affected by the latency arbitrage activity of HFT 
scalpers, with no countervailing benefit in volatility or any other measured variable. To improve 
market quality, and eliminate the socially wasteful arms race for speed, we propose batch auctions in 
every 70 milliseconds of trading.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Keywords: Agent-Based Modelling, High Frequency Trading, Algorithmic Trading, Market Regulation, Market 
Efficiency, Genetic Programming.  
JEL Classification: G10,G12, G14, G19  
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1.Introduction 
Wissner-Gross and Freer  (2010) suggest that the time light travels between antipodal points on the 
surface of the Earth takes 67 milliseconds, while recent computational advances transform HFT 
latencies below 500 microseconds (Bhupathi, 2010). Many HFT strategies are designed to exploit 
advantages in latency ± the time it takes to access and respond to market information (Wah and 
Wellman, 2013). Schneider (2012) estimates that trading on latency advantages account for $21 
billion profit each year. HFTrs are able to obtain such speed advantages over institutional investors by 
developing sophisticated trading algorithms combined with co-located computer systems, directly 
linked with trading venues. At the same time, market structure issues due to speed competition among 
HFTrs create the unintended consequence of allowing faster traders to gain revenue from trading with 
slower traders (McInish and Upson, 2013). The practice of HFT has generated several public 
controversies regarding its transparency and the fairness of market operations, as well as its 
implications for market quality (Wah and Wellman, 2013).  
However, most of the empirical work on the topic lacks the ability to identify which trades and quotes 
come from HFT, making it difficult to examine how HFT affects the market and other market 
participants (Egginton et al., 2012; Hirschey, 2013; Goldstein et al., 2014). This is due to the fact that 
no publicly available dataset, including NASDAQ 120, allows researchers to directly identify all HFT 
(Baron et al., 2012). Egginton et al., (2012) argue that is hardly possible to identify orders generated 
by computer algorithms in the U.S. equities markets, with all previous studies using proxies to 
measure the level of algorithmic trading and HFT1.  The huge number of variables and very 
complicated cause-effect relationships among these variables and potential outcomes imposes another 
research obstacle (Felker et al., 2014). Furthermore, empirically measuring informational differences 
between different investors represents DGLIILFXOWWDVNDVLQYHVWRUV¶LQIRUPDWLRQVHWs are unobservable 
(Ding et al., 2014).   
                                                          
1
 Hendershott et al. (2011) and Viljoen et al. (2014) implement the rate of electronic message traffic normalised 
by trading volume as proxies to identify specific HFT in the dataset. Brogaard et al. (2014) use proprietary data 
to detect specific HFT activity. Hendershott and Riordan (2013), Brogaard et al. (2013), and Baron et al. (2012) 
extract account- level trade-by trade data related to different contracts for grouping traders into different high 
frequency categories; these are, based on the level of their trading volume as well as inventory management.   
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 In contrast, this study uses a special adaptive form of Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) 
and real-time millisecond data from Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft to demonstrate the process of 
latency arbitrage in HFT. The STGP (described in Appendix B) is a sophisticated and extremely 
suitable trading algorithm that successfully replicates HFT scalping strategies. Wah and Wellman 
(2013) argue that questions about HFT implications are inherently computational in nature due to the 
fact that the speed of trading reveals details of internal market activities and the structure of 
communication channels. We subscribe directly WR1$6'$4¶VSecurity Information System (SIP), 
which is called the Unlisted Trading Privileges Quote Data Feed in order to reproduce the HFT 
scalping strategies in an artificial stock market environment. Here, the impact of these strategies can 
be examined and new regulations evaluated to maintain the overall health of the financial system.  
Using STGP, we replicate the interactions between HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs and compare 
their performance under the same underlying trading order streams. In other words, we simulate real-
life trading sessions, which allow us to avoid the obstacles in the studies discussed above. HFT 
scalping strategies originated as relatively simple spread detecting tools that came to understand the 
order book depth, posted on the best bid/ask and then moved quickly to the other side (Patterson, 
2012). These straightforward flipping strategies evolved over time to become the modern HFT 
scalping strategies that nowadays dominate electronic exchanges, gaining favourable queue positions 
and generating a huge amount of cancelled orders. The aim of HFT scalping strategies is to gain a 
favourable queue position ± any particular scalping strategy must have a high probability of entering 
the trade and an equally high probability of either exiting for spread or, if the spread cannot be gained, 
of immediately exiting in order to avoid losses (Bodek, 2013). 
To summarise, the contribution of this study is three-fold. First, this is the first study to use an 
innovative trading algorithm and real-time millisecond data to provide empirical evidence of how 
HFT scalping strategies are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer) at least 
1.5 milliseconds ahead of the NASDAQ SIP, creating a large number of latency arbitrage 
opportunities.  
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) developed the Regulation National Market System 
(Reg NMS) in 2007 in order to protect fair access to the best stock price for traditional investors. 
According to Reg NMS rules, trading venues are required to provide trading messages to the primary 
exchanges such as NASDAQ and NYSE. The SIPs for NASDAQ, which are called Unlisted Trading 
Privileges Quote Data FeedDORQJZLWK1<6(¶VConsolidated Quotation System, collect all relevant 
data and calculate the respective NBBO. Consequently, stock brokers are required to execute trading 
orders at NBBO prices or better (Ding et al.,2014). However, considering trading order information 
from all exchanges, the SIPs take some finite time, let us say G milliseconds, to calculate and for the 
NBBO to be distributed. Computationally sophisticated traders equipped with front-running scalping 
strategies such as HFT scalpers can process the order flow in less than G milliseconds and out- 
compute the SIP to calculate the NBBO. Under trading conditions of superhuman speed, quotes 
within an exchange could update faster than the exchange is able to distribute its new prices to other 
trading venues for NBBO evaluation. Our experiment detects the processing and calculation of both 
best bid and ask orders; it does this by simulating the communication patterns between HFT scalpers, 
aggressive HFTrs, NASDAQ SIPs and NASDAQ NBBO. Our empirical results demonstrate that the 
ability of HFT scalpers to create latency arbitrage opportunities makes trading more difficult and 
more costly for those traditional investors who lack access to sophisticated trading platforms.  
Second, this study provides the first real-life trading evidence whereby direct access to exchanges and 
appropriate trading software could generate profitable opportunities for HFT companies. We 
demonstrate that HFTrs equipped with scalping trading mechanisms are capable of capturing 
substantial risk-free profits at the expense of institutional investors. We also measure the precise level 
of profits generated by HFT scalpers and the exact costs of latency arbitrage for other market 
participants. Our findings suggest that there is an arms race in speed and how fast market participants 
have to be to capture profit opportunities. The size of the arbitrage opportunity, and hence the harm to 
institutional investors, may depend on the magnitude of speed and the cost of cutting-edge speed 
improvements.   
 5 | P a g e  
 
Third, we provide clear evidence of the implications of latency arbitrage for market quality and the 
relationship between market fragmentation and latency arbitrage strategies.  
Our empirical findings indicate that latency arbitrage not only reduces the profits of other market 
participants, but harms market efficiency. We observe tKDW+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJHDFWLYLW\
has negative implications on market efficiency as intraday volatility increases and market depth 
decreases. We propose an alternative financial market mechanism such as a batch auctioned market, 
which successfully eliminates latency arbitrage opportunities and improves efficiency. We suggest the 
implementation of batch auctions once every 70 milliseconds, that is 334,285 times per 6.5-hour 
trading day for each financial instrument. If trading orders are bunched together every 70 
milliseconds, HFT scalpers could face a queuing risk leading to a less harmful market quality effect. 
Our study is particularly timely as policymakers around the world are still debating as to whether HFT 
is beneficial or harmful to market efficiency (Manahov et al., 2014). To a certain extent this study can 
be seen as a tool assisting regulators in the more rigorous evaluation of the financial market.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 comprises the literature review on the 
topic. Section 3 presents the experimental design of the three artificial stock markets and data 
description. In Section 4, we e[DPLQHWKH+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity and profitability 
and investigate the implications of HFT scalpers on market quality and the associated regulatory 
measures. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. Additional clarifying and technical material can be 
found in Appendix A.  
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2.Related literature 
While Ready (1999) and Stoll and Schenzler (2006) perform empirical analysis to show how slow 
WUDGHUV¶RUGHUVSURYLGHa free trading option for fast traders, Cohen and Szpruch (2012) consider a 
single asset market model of latency arbitrage with one limit order book and two traders possessing 
different speeds of trade execution. This is to demonstrate that the fast trader employs a front-running 
strategy to capture the quantity that the slower trader intends to trade and generate a risk-free profit. 
However, the authors suggest that these profits cannot be scaled anGWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDµ7RELQ7a[¶
on financial transactions could lead to the elimination of profits from pre-emptive strategies. In 
contrast, our study measures the exact level of profit that HFTrs gain from latency arbitrage.    
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) examine trading behaviour and equilibrium information acquisition whereby 
some investors receive common private information before others. Their model implies that under 
some conditions better informed investors equipped with profit-taking strategies will focus only on a 
subset of securities, while ignoring other securities with similar characteristics. In a similar fashion, 
Foucault et al. (2013), model the strategic behaviour of a trader trading in public information faster 
than other traders, demonstrating WKDWZLWKDVSHHGDGYDQWDJHWKHLQIRUPHGWUDGHU¶VRUGHUIORZLV
much more volatile, accounts for a much bigger fraction of trading volume, and forecasts very short 
run price changes. In a rather different laboratory experiment, Wah and Wellman (2013) adopted an 
agent-based approach to simulate the interactions between high-frequency and zero-intelligence 
agents at the millisecond level. Similar to our empirical findings, the authors reported that market 
fragmentation and the presence of a latency arbitrageur reduces total surplus, leading to negative 
implications for liquidity.  
On 10th of March, 2008, the NYSE implemented a system upgrade designed to reduce its latency by 
600 milliseconds. McInish and Upson (2013) use this event to investigate the implications of the 
reduction in latency for trading quality. They observe that for trades executed at NBBO prices, order 
execution quality improves significantly but faster markets reduce the ability of fast liquidity suppliers 
to execute the quote-arbitrage strategy.  
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Easley et al. (2014), examine a different upgrade within WKH1<6(¶VWUDGLQJV\VWHPZKLFKZDV
implemented to reduce the latency of off-floor traders and show that this reduction improves liquidity, 
raising stock prices in comparison to that of on-floor traders. A portfolio consisting of long stocks that 
is undergoing the upgrade has a return of approximately 3 percent over the first 20 days of the 
upgrade. In another NBBO experiment, Ding et al. (2014), provide evidence as to the benefits of 
obtaining faster proprietary data feeds from stock exchanges over the regulated public consolidated 
data feeds. They measure and compare NBBO prices from each data feed to discover price 
dislocations in the NBBO that occur several times a second and last one to two milliseconds 
presenting opportunities for HFT latency arbitrage. The relatively short duration of dislocations is 
associated with small cost for infrequent traders but prove costly for frequent traders.  
Easley et al. (2012) argue that allowing exchanges to directly sell trade and quote data to some traders 
increases the cost of capital and worsens market liquidity in comparison to trading where all market 
participants freely observe previous prices. Moreover, allowing exchanges to sell price information is 
undesirable because it has negative implications on market quality, therefore such practice should be 
restricted.  
However, most of the studies on the topic rely on empirical tests and statistical evaluation of  
historical datasets. In contrast, we develop a more realistic scenario by simulating real-life trading 
with real-time millisecond data in order to investigate the relationships between fast and slow traders 
and the implications for market quality.    
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3.Experimental design 
Due to advances in technology and the rapid growth of high frequency trading, financial markets have 
eliminated human intermediation in the trading process and replaced them with electronic limit order 
books, which have led to the growth of trading algorithms as one of the main investment tools. Some 
of the trading algorithms generated imitate the behaviour of humans in the trading process, while over 
the last few years, these trading algorithms have substantially improved their speed to match bid and 
ask orders. 
We use a special adaptive form of Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP), which enables us to 
choose and adjust different parameters to suit our specification, such as the minimum price increment, 
number of participants and their wealth, the level of transaction costs, and different trading 
preferences. The exact number of evolutionary parameters that we can specify is listed in Table 1.  
Each market participant represents an artificial trader who is equipped with their own trading rule; the 
selection of best performing traders and the production of new genomes is conducted through the 
recombination of the parent genomes by crossover and mutation operations, which are further 
elaborated upon in Appendices A and B. The basic idea is that the WUDGHU¶VWUDGLQJUXOHZLOOLPSURYH
by a natural selection process based on the survival of the fittest (Witkam, 2014).  
Therefore, the evolutionary nature of the trading process and the price dynamics enable the artificial 
traders to recognise, learn and exploit profit opportunities while continually adapting to changing 
market conditions. Consequently, the STGP trading algorithm evolves the model step-by-step, feeding 
it with real-time millisecond quotes from Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft stocks; therefore the 
forecasting models evolve mimicking the actual markets studied. 0RGHOHYROXWLRQGRHVQ¶WHQGZKHQ
disconnected from the data feeder or when the quote file ends. It continues when new quotes are 
added to the database and there is no difference between the way historical quotes and new quotes are 
processed. 
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3.1. The process of developing initial trading rules 
Each individual trader has only one trading rule which is created randomly, enabling the whole range 
of possible trading rules to be studied (examples of trading rules can be found in Appendix B). To 
create later generations, we apply the crossover recombination technique and mutation operation, 
where the crossover recombination technique randomly chooses parts of two trading rules to exchange 
in order to create two new trading rules; the mutation operation randomly changes a small part of a 
trading rule. This process is repeated until at least one trading rule in the population achieves the 
desired level of fitness, which is PHDVXUHGE\DWUDGHU¶VLQYHVWPHQWUHWXUQRYHUDVSHFLILHGSHULRG,W
should be noted that this initial random nature can result in the creation of meaningless trading rules 
or trading rules which cannot be evaluated thoroughly since they do not return the value that the 
function needs.  Nevertheless, as Montana (1995) notes, these programming issues can be resolved by 
the introduction of STGP, where the process requires the definition of a specific set to fit the problem. 
Each trading rule in our artificial stock market setting takes real-time millisecond prices from Cisco 
Systems, Intel and Microsoft and generates advice consisting of the desired position, estimated as a 
SHUFHQWDJH RI WKH WUDGHU¶V ZHDOWK, and an order limit price for buying and selling the financial 
instrument2. The trading rules¶ logic comprises of information on price and volume, minimum, 
maximum and average functions related to millisecond price and trading volume data, as well as 
different logical and comparison operators.  
Moreover, traders are not allowed to directly communicate with each other in order to avoid herding 
behaviour that occurs when copying the trading activity of other traders. However, traders are able to 
indirectly exchange information through the artificial stock market and also through the breeding 
process. 
In the conventional Genetic Programming (GP) procedure, described in Appendix A, trading rules are 
evaluated by the same fitness function in each generation.  In contrasts, the STGP evaluates the fitness 
of traders through a dynamic fitness function, which enables the return estimation period to move 
forward and include the most recent quotes in the market.   
                                                          
2
 This process is further explained in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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Also, while GP replaces the entire genetic population through crossover and mutation techniques at 
one time, STGP only replaces a small proportion of the entire population, which ensures a gradual 
change in population and thus greater model stability (Witkam,  2014).  Another important feature of 
STGP is that each trader discovers the intrinsic value of the three stocks individually without any 
communication between traders, ensuring individuality and that the level of intelligence of each 
artificial trader is not affected by other traders. This allows the development of more meaningful 
trading rules for both HFT scalpers and strategic informed traders. 
3.2. Structure of the artificial stock market and the differences between HFT scalpers 
and aggressive HFTrs.  
We examine the profitability of HFT strategies within the context of a number of markets, each 
populated by up to 100,000 boundedly rational traders. None of the artificial traders in the model are 
orientated towards a predetermined formation of strategy and so are therefore free to develop and 
continually evolve new and better trading rules over time. We develop three different artificial stock 
markets for each of the three financial instruments under investigation. Each market is populated by 
50,000 aggressive HFTrs and 50,000 HFT scalpers (50 per cent of the total population based on the 
continuous Breeding Fitness Return). Both HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs are created using the 
STGP programming tecKQLTXHH[SODLQHGLQ$SSHQGL[$,QWHUPVRIDJJUHVVLYH+)WUV¶GHVLJn there is 
an important difference between two features: the horizon or holding period, measured by the length 
of time for which a position (long or short) is a financial instrument is held; and the trading costs 
measured by the bid-ask spread that must be crossed by trading orders.  
In order to generate profits, aggressive HFTrs must hold their positions for a sufficient period of time 
in order to overcome the transaction cost. Hence, the shorter the holding period, the more extreme the 
movements of price must be to ensure profitability. However, the main difference between the two 
WUDGLQJJURXSVLVWKDWWKH+)7VFDOSHUV¶ group consists of the traders who momentarily perform best 
in terms of the continuous Breeding Fitness Return; these, therefore possess lower latency. The 
Breeding Fitness Return is a trailing return of a wealth moving average which determines the fitness 
rules of traders.  
 11 | P a g e  
 
This return is calculated over the last n TXRWHVRIGDWDRIDQH[SRQHQWLDOPRYLQJDYHUDJHRIWUDGHUV¶
wealth, where n is set to the minimum breeding age with a maximum of 250. In the case where the 
age is less than n, no value is calculated. This particular type of return is used to measure the fitness 
criterion for the selection of traders to breed. Breeding is, in essence, a process of creating new 
artificial traders to replace poor performing ones based on the values derived from Equation (1) 
below. HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs process millisecond trading messages using direct data 
feed from the NASDAQ SIP. Although HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs both observe the same 
millisecond data from the three financial instruments and also generate trading orders, HFT scalpers 
are able to access and process the data first due to their low latency features. In other words, HFT 
scalpers are able to foresee the quotes of the three financial instruments and submit trading orders 
before the contribution of aggressive HFTrs. Both HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs operate in the 
same market and accumulate wealth by investing in two financial instruments that are available on the 
artificial stock market; the three risky financial instruments and the risk-free instrument represented 
by cash. Because the three artificial stock markets continuously evolve, traders with trading rules that 
perform well become wealthier, positively influencing the forecasting accuracy of the model. In each 
period, DQDUWLILFLDOWUDGHU¶VZHDOWKFDQEHVKRZQE\WKHIROORZLQJIRUPXOD: 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
where is the wealth accumulated by trader in period ; and represents the money and 
amount of security held by artificial trader , in period 
,
and is the price of the asset in period .  
3.3. Clearing mechanism and order generation for the three artificial stock markets.  
The three artificial stock markets are simulated double auction markets where all the buy and sell 
orders from artificial traders are collected. The traders receive real-time quotes from Cisco Systems, 
Intel and Microsoft, before evaluating their trading rule and subsequently calculating the number of 
shares that need to be purchased or sold. In the case that shares need to be purchased or sold, an order 
is generated to buy or sell the required amount of shares determined by the specified limit price.  
, , ,i t i t t i tW M Ph 
,i tW i t ,i tM ,i th
i t tP t
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For example, if a trader holds 1,000 shares of Intel priced at $38.50 and $80,000 in cash, his wealth 
will be $118,500 and his position will be 32.5%. The trading rule generates advice of a position of 
50% and a limit price of $38.50. Therefore a limit order will be produced to purchase 539 
(=50%*118,500/38.50-1000) additional Intel shares with a price of $38.50 each. Each of the three 
artificial stock markets then calculates the clearing price and all trading orders are executed at that 
price.  At the same time, the clearing price is the price which can match the highest trading volume 
from limit orders.   
In cases when the same highest trading volume can be matched at multiple price levels, then the 
clearing price will be represented as the average of the lowest and the highest of those prices. The 
number of shares purchased by traders is always equal to the number of shares sold by traders. If the 
total number of shares offered (at or below clearing price) exceeds the total number of shares asked 
for (at or above clearing price) or vice versa, the remaining orders will not be executed in full (partial 
execution of trading orders). Under such conditions, orders at the clearing price will be selected for 
execution with priority given to market orders over the limit orders and then on a first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) basis (Witkam, 2014).  
3.4. Description of data and transaction costs.  
HFTrs mainly trade the most liquid stocks (Brogaard et al. 2014) because this translates into narrower 
bid-ask spreads. According to Picardo (2014), low volatility and low stock price are the two additional 
stock attributes uniquely suited for HFT. While traditional traders like high volatility, because large 
price fluctuations provide more profit opportunities, HFTrs prefer low volatility securities because 
their strategies are based on generating very small amounts of profit thousands of times each day. 
Stock price is an important factor for choosing the appropriate financial instruments for HFT. This is 
because HFT rebates are based on the number of shares traded, and therefore for the same amount of 
money involved in a trade, HFTrs are capable of producing a larger total rebate on a lower-priced 
asset than on a higher-priced asset.  
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In order to determine which stocks to include in this study, we examine the Russell 3000 Index and 
the following three selective criteria: stock price below $50 (benchmark for identification of low-
priced stocks), beta of less than 1.5 (benchmark for identification of stocks with volatility less than 
50% higher than the market), and market capitalisation of at least $50 billion (benchmark for 
identification of blue chip liquid stocks). We find that Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft (all traded 
on NASDAQ) satisfy all the selection criteria. We subscribe directly WR1$6'$4¶V6,3, which is 
called the Unlisted Trading Privileges Quote Data Feed, from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014. 
Our real-time data is delivered via the NxCore platform which allows transmission of 4,500,000 
quotes per second or 8 billion quotes per trading day. The STGP trading algorithm processes 579,003 
trading messages stamped at the millisecond interval for Cisco Systems; 412,047 trading messages at 
the same frequency for Intel; and 398,224 millisecond trading messages for Microsoft. We also use 
NASDAQ NBBO data from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 to compare the HFT scalpers and 
DJJUHVVLYH+)7UV¶activity with the best bid and ask prices in order to determine the presence of 
latency arbitrage opportunities. Narang (2013) reports that the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) impose typical round trip transaction costs of $0.003 per share. We employ 
transaction costs of $0.004 for our profit calculations. Although slightly higher than the current 
standards, the level of transaction costs takes into account the operational costs of HFT companies 
such as investments in technology, data and collection fees, and salaries. Also included are  software 
platforms and, labour and risk management systems, but the co-location of servers is not included.  
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4.Experimental results. 
4.1.High-frequency trading and latency arbitrage.  
First, we examine what happens to the trading orders of Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft after 
being submitted to the three artificial stock markets3. Jarnecic and Snape (2014) examine the order 
submission strategies of HFTs and traditional traders in the limit order book and observe that high-
frequency participants cancel orders of all durations from around the best quotes. This thereby reduces 
the certainty of execution prices, making trading more difficult for non-HFT participants, causing 
prices to be more transient. Let denote the time between order submission and cancellation. The 
probability of cancellation in the interval is represented by the distribution function: 
                                                      PrCancelP t tW d                                                              (2) 
We extract all trading activity generated by the STGP trading algorithm for the three financial 
instruments to estimate the distribution function separately for each of the three stocks using the life-
table method, and taking execution as the censoring event.  
In contrast to all other studies, we are able to directly observe the number of executed and cancelled 
orders by extracting generated data from the STGP trading algorithm (reported in Table 2). 
Interestingly, a very large number of limit orders submitted by HFT scalpers are cancelled within a 
very short interval of order submission. According to Table 2,  70CancelP , the probability of a 
cancellation within 70 milliseconds is 0.933. By the time 250 milliseconds has elapsed, this 
probability substantially decreases to 0.051. At the same time the probability of cancellation for 
aggressive HFTrs measured at 70 milliseconds is 0.019 increasing to 0.087 at 250 milliseconds.  
A comparison of cancelled orders by HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs indicates that HFT scalpers 
cancel a significantly larger proportion of orders after a very short duration.  
                                                          
3
 All trading volumes, latency arbitrage opportunities, profits and latency arbitrage costs are comparable within 
artificial stock market settings.  
W
 @0,t
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Table 2 suggests that although HFT scalpers cancel a large number of trading orders within 70 
milliseconds to position themselves at the top of the order book, between 0 and 70 milliseconds, their 
execution rate is also quite high. At the same time, the aggressive HFTrs¶RUGHUVUHDFKWKHPDUNHWDWD
later stage and the orders are executed at worse prices due to the increasing steep pricing schedule. 
Lower latency demonstrated by the HFT scalpers provides them with a large number of latency 
arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, HFT scalpers purchasing the three stocks that aggressive HFTrs 
intend to buy could increase asset prices before aggressive HFTrs submit trading orders, thereby 
increasing their costs. In real-life trading many market participants are not equipped with powerful 
computers and sophisticated trading algorithms and they usually update their trading positions with 
delays. During periods of delays their orders become stale and faster traders quickly capture them. Li 
(2014) examines the strategic interactions of HFTs with different speeds and concludes that front- 
running HFTs should impose a speed tax on normal traders, making markets less liquid and prices less 
informative.  
We subscribe directly to the NASDAQ SIP feed, which provides the NBBO for all stocks listed on 
NASDAQ to estimate the actual latency magnitude between the two groups of artificial high 
frequency traders and NASDAQ NBBO using the following equations: 
             ( , )HFTscalpers HFTscalpers i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                           (3) 
           ( , )aggressiveHFTrs aggressiveHFTrs i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                    (4) 
where  ,HFTscalpers i tTimestamp measure the trading messages processes by HFT scalpers directly from 
the NASDAQ SIP for security i at time t ,  .aggressiveHFTrs i tTimestamp measures the trading message 
processes by aggressive HFTrs directly from the NASDAQ SIP for security i at time t , 
NBBOTimestamp represents NASDAQ NBBO data from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014. 
We extract the generated data from the three artificial stock markets to compare the performance of 
HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs with NASDAQ NBBO for the period under investigation. 
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Negative latency values of Equations (3) and (4) indicate that HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs are 
able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO faster than the NASDAQ SIP. Tables 3, 4, and 5 illustrate that 
while HFT scalpers generate negative latency values between 1.5 and 2.8 milliseconds, aggressive 
HFTrs generate positive latency values between 1.8 and 5.2. This finding suggests that HFT scalpers 
are capable of calculating NASDAQ NBBO at least 1.5 milliseconds ahead of the public NASDAQ 
SIP feed for the three financial instruments. Our empirical results demonstrate that negative latency 
YDOXHVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDQXPEHURIODWHQF\DUELWUDJHRSSRUWXQLWLHV+)7VFDOSHUV¶ ability to 
calculate NASDAQ NBBO between 1.5 and 2.8 milliseconds ahead of the public NASDAQ SIP 
provides them with latency arbitrage opportunities. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that the number of latency 
arbitrage opportunities vary between 306 and 1,609 per day per stock.   
:KLOHWKH6(&¶VFRQFHSWRI equity market structure suggests that latency for the SIPs is about 5 
milliseconds, the average latency of HFT scalpers for the Cisco Systems is 1.81 milliseconds,1.92 
milliseconds for Intel, and 1.99 milliseconds for Microsoft. As a comparison, the average time it takes 
to execute a trading order is about 300 microseconds (Ding et al., 2014). Hence, those other market 
participants who are waiting for trading messages from NASDAQ NBBO in order to decide at what 
price to place their trading orders for Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft, can face disadvantages. One 
example of latency arbitrage includes dark pools that implement NASDAQ NBBO as a reference 
price for matching trading orders can EHPDWFKHG$VVXPLQJWKDW1$6'$4XSGDWHV&LVFR6\VWHPV¶
bid price from $27 to $28, and the ask price is still $29, the mid-price will change from $28 to $28.5. 
In the first 1.5 to 2.8 milliseconds, slower traders such as aggressive HFTrs are not aware of the price 
change and if they place trading orders at mid-price in a dark pool, faster traders such as HFT scalpers 
can purchase the stock at $28. This will allow HFT scalpers to sell Cisco Systems in the dark pool for 
$28.50 after 2.8 milliseconds have elapsed.  
Next, we calculate the daily Herfindahl trading concentration index for NASDAQ NBBO, which 
includes data from different U.S exchanges. The relatively large variation in the Herfindahl index 
values reported in the last column of Tables 3, 4 and 5 suggest that the NASDAQ NBBO dataset 
 17 | P a g e  
 
represent the true fragmentation of trading at the best bid and best offer collected from a number of 
different trading venues.      
Table 6 illustrates the correlations between HFT scalpers¶ variables in the form of univariate 
regressions with security fixed effects. The correlations are very useful for evaluating the implications 
of latency arbitrage opportunities on stock properties. We estimate the statistical significance, 
controlling for heteroskedasticity by using the following regression: 
Number of latency arbitrage  opportunitiesi,t= 
, ,i i t i txD E H                                                              (5) 
where the number of latency opportunitiesi,t measure the latency opportunities for security i on day t , 
iD represents the fixed security effect, and ,i tx is the characteristic for security i on day t . We have 
taken logarithms of price, trading volume, and the number of latency opportunities in order to account 
for the substantial cross-sectional heteroskedasticity of the variables.  
Table 6 reports that correlations between the number of latency arbitrage opportunities, price, 
volatility and trading volume are all positive and statistically significant at 0.95 and 0.99 levels of 
significance. As the coefficients on volatility are positive and statistically significant for the number 
of latency arbitrage opportunities, the more the prices of the three stocks change, the more often 
latency arbitrage opportunities will occur.  
Volatility can potentially act as another generator of latency arbitrage opportunities because it can 
force liquidity providers to adjust their trading orders more frequently. Although trading volume is 
positively correlated with the number of latency arbitrage opportunities, the Herfindahl trading 
concentration index is negatively correlated with the number of latency arbitrage opportunities.   
To further investigate the relationship betweHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJHDFWLYLW\DQG1$6'$4 
NBBO, we estimate pooled, fixed effect regressions of changes to price updates at two price levels 
relative to the inside on changes in quote midpoint prices and quoted depth.  
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Our analysis is limited to two price levels because day traders usually use level two quotes to access 
bids and offers for a particular financial instrument. We estimate the following model for the two 
dependent variables such as a change in the quote midpoint prices and the quoted depth:  
5 5
1 2
0 , , ,
1 1
it k i t k k i t k i t it it
k k
Y Numpriceupdates Numpriceupdates XD D E J H 
  
'  '  '  ¦ ¦   (6) 
 where itY' measure changes in quote midpoint prices and quoted depth regressed on changes to price 
message updates at the inside and the first price away from the inside quote for stock i at time t , 
1
,i t kNumpriceupdates ' and 2 ,i t kNumpriceupdates ' represent changes in the number of price 
updates for the inside quoted prices and the first and second price levels relative to the inside quotes, 
X consists of a set of control variables including 10 lags of each of the two dependent variables: five 
periods of lagged volume, five lags of each bid and ask quote changes, as well as bid and ask depth 
changes and time dummy variables.  
We follow Harris and Saad (2014) to estimate the changes in quoted midpoint prices: 
                          
5
,
1
it i k i t k it it it
k
Midprices Messages XD E G H
 
'   '  ¦                            (7) 
where Messages' consists of five independent variables such as Numpriceupdates' , 
Numdepthupdates' , Numreserveupdates' (changes in the number of nonvisible depth updates),  
Totalmessageupdates' (changes in every message sent), Newmessagearrivals' (changes in new 
messages that do not change displayed prices), X measures the same set of controlling variables as in 
Equation (6).  
The physical proximity to the trading venue and the technology of the trading system both contribute 
to latency. Hence, we take into account the physical as well as wire distance between the NASDAQ 
SIP and our processing server by implementing a separate lag adjustment. For comparison purposes, 
we select the quote lag that maximizes the number of trades that execute at NASDAQ NBBO for each 
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stock day. In other words, for each day and each of the three stocks there is an individual lag 
adjustment. Tables 7, 8 and 9 show that changes in the NASDAQ SIP quote midpoint prices at all lags 
and all price levels generated E\+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity, are jointly and significantly 
related to changes in NASDAQ NBBO for Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft. We also observe that 
changes in quoted depth for all lags and all price levels generated E\+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH 
activity are jointly and significantly related to changes in NASDAQ NBBO for each of the three 
financial instruments.  
These findings confirm the assumption that HFT scalpers are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO 
ahead of the NASDAQ SIP, providing them with the opportunity of latency arbitrage (this is evident 
by their ability to presage the advent of midpoint price changes up to 2.8 milliseconds in advance). 
Our empirical results are consistent with Narang (2010) and McInish et al. (2014) who argue that 
HFT strategies are able to jump ahead of trading orders placed by other investors via Intermarket 
Sweep Orders (ISOs) and thus earn substantial profits. Patterson et al. (2013) observe that HFTrs 
profit by exploiting a hidden loophole in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). This loophole 
allows HFTrs with a direct connection to the CME to know of their own trade executions 10 
milliseconds before informing the other market participants about the trade; this enables HFTrs to 
submit other orders and use this information for trading purposes ahead of the rest of the market.   
By anticipating future NBBO, HFT scalpers can capitalise on cross-market disparities prior to their 
reflection in the public price quote, in effect front-running incoming trading orders to earn a small but 
sure profit.   
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4.2.High-frequency trading profitability.  
We will now quantify the latency arbitrage opportunities for our HFT scalpers. Ding et al. (2014) 
suggest that the average price difference between the NASDAQ SIP and the NBBOs for Intel is 
$0.0107 per share. We follow Ding et al. (2014) to estimate that the average price difference for Cisco 
Systems is $0.0201 per share (average share price of Cisco Systems in June 2014 multiplied by the 
percentage of average arbitrage opportunities) and $0.0083 per share for Microsoft. For a more 
realistic trading scenario we employ appropriate transaction costs. Narang (2013) reports that the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) impose typical round trip transaction costs of $0.003 per 
share, while we employ transaction costs of $0.004 for our profit calculations. Although slightly 
higher than the current standards, the level of transaction costs take into account the operational costs 
of HFT companies such as investments in technology, data and collection fees, as well as salaries. 
These include software platforms, labour and risk management systems but do not include the co-
location of servers. Multiplying the average price difference following transaction costs by the trading 
volume of the three financial instruments reported in column 2 of Table 10 yields the profits 
accumulated by HFT scalpers on each trading day for each stock. We find positive relationship 
between WUDGLQJYROXPHJHQHUDWHGE\RXUDUWLILFLDOVWRFNPDUNHWWUDGHUVDQG+)7VFDOSHUV¶SURILWV  
The lowest risk-free profit generated by HFT scalpers was $48.49 for Microsoft on 23rd of June, 2014, 
while the highest risk-free profit of $382.00 was recorded for Cisco Systems on 18th of June, 2014. 
The average risk-free profit per day for trading Cisco Systems in June 2014 was $312.94; $104.42 for 
trading Intel; and $61.13 for trading Microsoft. Brogaard et al. (2013) can be seen to examine 26 high 
frequency trading companies trading on NASDAQ between 2008 and 2009, reporting that they earn 
an average profit of $30 per day, per company for small stocks, $174 for medium and $6,651 for 
large. However, the authors report substantially high trading volumes for all stocks traded by the 26 
high frequency firms.  
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Considering the fact that that the average price difference between the NASDAQ SIP and the 
NASDAQ NBBOs is $0.0201 per share for Cisco Systems, $0.0107 for Intel, and $0.0083 for 
Microsoft, we calculate the cost of +)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\RQ institutional investors submitting random 
market orders. We estimate that there are 1,094 latency arbitrage opportunities for Cisco Systems on 
2nd of June, 2014 during the 6.5-hour trading day (approximately 0.047 latency arbitrage opportunities 
per second). Considering the latency of 1.6 milliseconds for HFT scalpers for this particular day, 
implies that for 0.0752 (0.047 multiplied by 1.6) milliseconds of each second the NASDAQ SIP and 
the NASDAQ NBBO differ. This could result in a buy or sell order heading to the wrong trading 
exchange half that often: 0.038%. We multiply the average price difference of $0.0201 by the 
percentage of the time latency arbitrage opportunities occur (0.038%), to estimate an expected latency 
arbitrage opportunity of $0.00076 per 100 shares for a market order submitted randomly during 
trading time. We then multiply this amount of money by Cisco SystHPV¶WUDGLQJYROXPHRIIRU 
2nd of June, 2014 to find out that the cost of latency arbitrage for that day was $0.15.  
Table 11 indicates that the lowest cost of +)7VFDOSHUV¶latency arbitrage on institutional traders was 
$0.02 for Microsoft on 12th,16th and 19th of June and the highest latency arbitrage cost was $0.19 for 
Cisco Systems on 4th and 24th of June. The average cost of latency arbitrage for Cisco systems was 
$0.13; $0.04 for Intel; and $0.04 for Microsoft. Although these numbers suggest that market 
participants submitting random market orders are unlikely to experience significant latency arbitrage 
costs, investors trading when latency opportunities occur are facing substantial costs. This is 
especially valid in real-life trading, where all HFT companies generate a huge trading volume 
resulting in high levels of latency arbitrage costs. However, one of the shortcomings of our cost of 
latency estimations is that NASDAQ NBBO is updated many times per second (artificial stock market 
traders also submit trading orders many times per second) resulting in more than 0.047 latency 
arbitrage opportunities per second.  
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4.3.High-frequency trading and market quality  
Biais et al. (2011), Budish et al. (2013), Schwartz and Wu (2013), and Menkveld (2014) argue that 
the superhuman speed of trading and a continuous limit order book could lead to a socially wasteful 
arms race amongst HFTrs, imposing severe disadvantages on traditional investors. Narang (2010) 
reports that the current rebate stock market structure based on volume unfairly benefits HFTrs over 
ordinary traders. To test these arguments empirically we examine the implications RI+)7VFDOSHUV¶
latency arbitrage activity on market quality by defining several measures of market quality: two 
measures of liquidity and two measures of short-term volatility . The first measure of liquidity is the 
Effective Spread ((best ask price ± best bid price) / (bestask + bestbid) / 2). Depth represents the 
second measure of liquidity and is estimated as the time-weighted average of the number of trades in 
the book at the best posted prices in the sample period. The first measure of short-term volatility (HP 
± LP) is defined as the highest price minus the lowest price divided by the midpoint of the highest 
price and the lowest price in the sample. High-Low represents the second measure of short-term 
volatility and is defined as the highest mid-quote minus the lowest mid-quote. While HFT scaOSHUV¶
trading volume and market quality are dependent variables in our experiment, five lags of the two 
dependent variables act as explanatory variables. TKHELYDULDWH9$5PRGHORI+)7VFDOSHUV¶WUDGLQJ
volume and market quality for each day from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 has been 
designed to capture the trading activity for each stock and each day in the sample:  
                             (8)   
                                               (9) 
where  is the total volume for the period, and is the market quality variable. 
There are four measures as a proxy for market quality: The Effective Spread, Depth, HP-LP and High-
Low.   
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The results reported in Table 12 demonstrate the negative implications of HFT VFDOSHUV¶latency 
arbitrage activity on market quality. A comparison between HFT scalpers and HP- LP indicates that 
HFT scalpers are significantly affected by intra-day volatility, and volatility is increased as a result of 
the activity of HFT scalpers. We examine the effect of HFT scalpers on High- Low and observe that, 
as with HP-LP, the volatility has an effect on HFT scalpers and HFT scalpers increase intraday 
volatility. After analysing the effect of HFT scalpers on the Effective Spread and finding that the 
coefficients 0.079 and (-0.003) for the first lagged HFT scalpers are insignificant, we conclude that 
+)7VFDOSHUV¶DFWLYLW\GRHVQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\QDUURZWKHVXEVHTXHQWHIIHFWLYHVSUHDGIRU the three 
stocks within the artificial stock market settings. Finally, we examine the relation between HFT 
scalpers and Depth DQGILQGWKDWDKLJKHUOHYHORI+)7VFDOSHUV¶DFWLYLW\LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKORZHU
levels of market depth. Our empirical findings show that market efficiency is negatively affected by 
the trading activity of HFT scalpers, with no countervailing benefit in volatility or any other measured 
variable.  These findings are in line with Lee (2014) but counter to the results of Brogaard (2010), 
Hansbrouck and Saar (2009) and Hendershott  and Riordan (2011).   
4.4 High-frequency trading and market regulation.  
Trading at superhuman speeds poses potential regulatory questions, including whether such rapid 
trading has negative implications on a broker¶V ability to perform affirmative obligations, such as 
execution at NBBO prices. Considering the fact that HFT scalpers are already much faster than other 
market participants, their ability to invest in the latest software technology to shave a few 
milliseconds off creates the conditions of an arms race. Our experimental results suggest that HFT 
VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity precipitates an arms race, as even faster traders can calculate 
NASDAQ NBBO to see the future NASDAQ NBBO, and so on. The speed race could lead to a 
FODVVLFSULVRQHU¶VGLOHPPD+)7VFDOSHUVLQYHVWLQVSHHGWRWU\WRFDSWXUHDVPDQ\DVSRVVLEOHODWHQF\
DUELWUDJHRSSRUWXQLWLHVDJJUHVVLYH+)7UVVKRXOGLQYHVWLQVSHHGWRPDWFK+)7VFDOSHUV¶WUDGLQJ
activity; and all market participants should be better off if they collectively decide not to invest in 
speed, but it is each market participant interest to continue to invest in speed.  Similar to Budish et al. 
(2013), we observe that the latency arms race is a result of continuous trading.  
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Budish et al. (2013) argue that the HFT arms race is a result of the continuous operation of current 
financial markets and propose the introduction of frequent batch auctions. These batch auctions 
represent uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions performed at frequent but also discrete time 
intervals. The auction takes the form of a sealed bid not visible to other traders during the batch 
interval and the exchange collects all receive orders at the end of each batch interval, estimating the 
aggregate of demand and supply functions out of all bid and ask orders. The market should clear at the 
point where supply equals demand, with all transactions occurring at the same price, which is the 
uniform price. Trading orders are not visible to other traders and the exchange distributes the 
aggregate supply and demand functions at the end of each batch interval. The authors suggest that 
frequent batch auctions can eliminate the arms race by significantly reducing the value of a tiny speed 
advantage. The current continuous order book process allows latency arbitrage and front-running of 
trading orders due to the serial sequence of market orders. In contrast, under the conditions for batch 
auctions, multiple traders observe the same information at the same time enhancing price rather than 
speed competition. Budish et al. (2013) suggest that in equilibrium of the batch auctions, bid-ask 
spreads are narrower and markets are deeper providing greater social welfare. Moreover, batch 
auctions provide exchanges, with longer periods of time for processing orders before the next queue 
of batch orders. This could ease the computational process in all trading venues world-wide, making 
financial markets less vulnerable to crises like the Flash Crash in 2010. The authors propose batch 
auctions at intervals such as once per second (23,400 times per day per security). Although, Menkveld 
(2014) claims that batch auctions should be scheduled at a rate of 10 auctions per second, enabling 
traders to see the prices in the last auction before conducting the next auction, our empirical results 
illustrate that HFT scalpers generate large profits and cancel a large number of orders in very short 
intervals, that is, between 0 and 70 milliseconds (reported in Table 2). Introducing batch auctions at 
frequencies such as 10 per second could prove inefficient, so, we therefore recommend the 
implementation of batch auctions once per 70 milliseconds (334,285 times per 6.5 ± hour trading day 
per security) based on the distribution of cancelled orders in Table 2. Bunching together incoming 
trading orders every 70 milliseconds would impose a queuing risk for HFT scalpers, leading to 
positive implications for market quality.    
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5.Conclusions 
The application of sophisticated computational trading strategies at very low latency has increased 
over time. Significant trading software improvements are constantly introduced, raising operating 
costs and increasing competitive advantage among market participants. As communication and 
trading speed in financial markets has decreased over time, regulators face additional challenges in 
terms of addressing the speed differentials of market participants.   
In this study, we simulate real-life trading within artificial stock market settings and observe that HFT 
scalpers are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO at least 1.5 milliseconds ahead of the NASDAQ SIP, 
creating a large number of latency arbitrage opportunities. We also measure the precise level of 
profits generated by HFT scalpers and the exact costs of latency arbitrage to other market participants. 
Moreover, we observe that HFT scalpers¶ODWHQF\DUELWrage activity accumulates a large number of 
cancelled orders in a very short period of time, which may make trading more difficult and costly for 
traditional investors who lack access to sophisticated trading platforms. If one group of market 
participants such as HFT scalpers is able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO ahead of the NASDAQ SIP, 
those participants with lower latency would have an unfair advantage in the marketplace creating 
socially wasteful arms race for speed. We observe that the size of the arbitrage opportunity, and hence 
the harm to traditional investors, may depend on the magnitude of speed and the cost of cutting-edge 
speed improvements.   
In terms of market quality, we have found that +)7VFDOSHUV¶latency arbitrage activity has negative 
implications on market efficiency, as intraday volatility increases and market depth decreases.   
Nearly all financial markets around the world operate on a continuous trading basis, allowing 
computationally advantaged traders such as HFT scalpers to generate risk-free profits. We propose an 
alternative financial market mechanism such as the batch auctioned market, which successfully 
eliminates latency arbitrage opportunities and improves efficiency. A batch auctioned financial 
market could prevent HFTrs from gaining an advantage in terms of latency, thereby increasing surplus 
for ordinary traders.  
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We suggest the implementation of batch auctions once in every 70 milliseconds, that is 334,285 times 
per 6.5-hour trading day per financial instrument. If trading orders are bunched together every 70 
milliseconds, HFT scalpers could face a queuing risk, leading to a less harmful market quality effect. 
Perhaps the main practical implication of our study comes from our demonstrating that market 
regulators and operators can apply artificial intelligence tools such as STGP to conduct trading 
behaviour-based profiling, as well as capture the occurrence of new HFT strategies and examine their 
impact on the financial markets. However, a possible limitation of this study is that all trading 
volumes, latency arbitrage opportunities, profits and latency arbitrage costs are comparable within 
artificial stock market settings. In comparison with real-life investors, artificial traders are 
programmed to obey orders and perform certain tasks lacking feelings and emotions.  In any case, 
trading at superhuman speeds is likely to remain a major field of interest for researchers as well as a 
concern for market regulators over the next few years.   
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                                                      Appendices              
                                                                                 Artificial stock market parameters 
Total population size (traders)  100,0000 
HFT VFDOSHUV¶VL]HSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHWRWDOSRSXODWLRQ 50% 
$JJUHVVLYH+)7UV¶VL]HSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHWRWDOSRSXODWLRQ 50% 
Initial wealth (equal for all traders) 100,000 
Significant Forecasting range 0% to 10% 
Number of decimal places to round quotes on importing 2 
Minimum price increment for prices generated by model 0.01 
Minimum position unit 20% 
Maximum genome size 4096* 
Maximum genome depth 20** 
Minimum initial genome depth 2 
Maximum initial genome depth 5 
Breeding cycle frequency (quotes) 1 
Minimum breeding age (quotes) 80*** 
Initial selection type random 
Parent selection (percentage of initial selection that will breed)  5%**** 
Mutation probability (per offspring)  10% 
Total number of quotes processed- Cisco Systems 579,003 (from 02/06/2014 to 30/06/2014)  
Total number of quotes processed- Intel 412,047 (from 02/06/2014 to 30/06/2014) 
Total number of quotes processed- Microsoft 398,224 (from 02/06/2014 to 30/06/2014) 
Seed generation from clock Yes 
Creation of unique genomes Yes 
Offspring will replace the worst performing traders of the initial 
selection   
Yes 
 
0D[LPXPJHQRPHVL]HPHDVXUHWKHWRWDOQXPEHURIQRGHVLQDQWUDGHU¶VWUDGLQJUXOH$QRGHLVDJHQHLQWKHJHQRPHVXFKDVDfunction or 
a value.  
**MaxiPXPJHQRPHGHSWKPHDVXUHVWKHKLJKHVWQXPEHURIKLHUDUFKLFDOOHYHOVWKDWRFFXUVLQDQWUDGHU¶VJHQRPHWUDGLQJUXOH7KHGHSth of 
a trading rule can be an indicator of its complexity.  
***This is the minimum age required for agents to qualify for potential participation in the initial selection. The age of a trader is 
represented by the number of quotes that have been processed since the trader was created. This measure also specifies the period over 
which agent performance will be compared. Our minimum brHHGLQJDJHLVVHWWRZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKHWUDGHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRYHUWKHODVW
80 quotes will be compared.   
 
****5% of the best performing traders of the initial selection that will act as parents in crossover operations for creating new traders.  
 
 Table 1. Artificial Stock Market Parameter Settings.  
 
                                                                                                    HFT scalpers 
Time (milliseconds) Cancellation  Execution 
                  0-70 0.933 0.064 
                71-100 0.762 0.049 
                101-150 0.399 0.033 
               151-200 0.201 0.007 
               201-250 0.051 0.003 
                                                                                               Aggressive HFTrs 
                   0-70 0.019 0.078 
                 71-100 0.025 0.082 
                101-150 0.037 0.088 
                151-200 0.056 0.153 
                201-250 0.087 0.160 
This table presents a histogram of cancellation and execution within the millisecond interval (data has been generated and extracted from the 
STGP trading algorithm from 2 June, 2014 to 30 June, 2014). The probabilities are estimated as  1 S t , where  S t represent the survival 
function of cancellation and execution. In order to calculate the survival function we extracted all trading activity for Cisco Systems, Intel 
and Microsoft generated by STGP trading algorithm and used the life-table method.   
Table 2. Histogram of cancellation and execution of limit orders by HFT scalpers and aggressive 
HFTrs generated by STGP trading algorithm for Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft.   
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                                                                                      HFT scalpers 
Date Trading volume Latency* Number of latency 
arbitrage 
opportunities 
Herfindahl index for 
NASDAQ NBBO 
02/06/2014 20,347 -1.6 1094 3.86 
03/06/2014 19,009 -1.5 1502 4.92 
04/06/2014 19,822 -1.5 1500 4.93 
05/06/2014 18,251 -1.8 912 2.81 
06/06/2014 18,111 -1.6 1000 3.87 
09/06/2014 15,983 -1.9 803 2.72 
10/06/2014 22,575 -2.0 687 2.54 
11/06/2014 20,262 -2.1 610 1.50 
12/06/2014 19,999 -2.1 608 1.51 
13/06/2014 19,634 -2.0 699 2.48 
16/06/2014 19,120 -2.2 517 1.46 
17/06/2014 17,845 -1.8 900 3.83 
18/06/2014 23,727 -1.6 1036 4.88 
19/06/2014 16,891 -1.7 1001 4.79 
20/06/2014 18,776 -2.0 690 2.51 
23/06/2014 20,292 -2.4 477 2.45 
24/06/2014 19,890 -1.5 1511 4.94 
25/06/2014 18,276 -1.6 1029 4.86 
26/06/2014 18,393 -1.5 1517 4.95 
27/06/2014 20,818 -1.9 800 3.74 
30/06/2014 20,164 -1.8 911 3.80 
                                                                                   Aggressive HFTrs  
02/06/2014 7,557 2.8 0 1.29 
03/06/2014 8,313 3.3 0 1.31 
04/06/2014 8,001 3.0 0 1.43 
05/06/2014 9,123 3.5 0 1.38 
06/06/2014 9,204 2.0 0 1.24 
09/06/2014 11,782 2.5 0 2.31 
10/06/2014 4,882 2.8 0 0.99 
11/06/2014 6,999 2.7 0 0.84 
12/06/2014 7,524 2.9 0 1.27 
13/06/2014 8,009 3.0 0 1.26 
16/06/2014 8,110 3.1 0 1.43 
17/06/2014 10,030 2.6 0 1.32 
18/06/2014 3,626 2.3 0 0.19 
19/06/2014 10,889 2.2 0 1.85 
20/06/2014 6,856 2.0 0 1.20 
23/06/2014 6,161 2.1 0 1.19 
24/06/2014 8,251 2.2 0 1.48 
25/06/2014 9,552 2.7 0 0.90 
26/06/2014 9,774 2.5 0 0.85 
27/06/2014 6,984 3.0 0 2.29 
30/06/2014 7,006 2.7 0 1.37 
This table presents the trading volume, the latency, the number of latency opportunities and the Herfindahl index for Cisco Systems from 2nd 
of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated by STGP.  
* We estimate the actual latency magnitude between the two groups of artificial high frequency traders and NASDAQ NBBO using the 
following equations:  
             ( , )HFTscalpers HFTscalpers i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                           
           ( , )aggressiveHFTrs aggressiveHFTrs i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                    
Negative latency values indicates that HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO faster than NASDAQ SIP. 
Table 3. Statistical measures for Cisco Systems from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated 
by HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs.  
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                                                                                      HFT scalpers 
Date Trading volume Latency* Number of latency 
arbitrage 
opportunities 
Herfindahl index for 
NASDAQ NBBO 
02/06/2014 13,237 -2.0 619 2.62 
03/06/2014 14,002 -1.9 778 3.74 
04/06/2014 15,265 -2.2 501 2.57 
05/06/2014 15,789 -2.5 388 1.51 
06/06/2014 16,489 -1.9 723 2.83 
09/06/2014 12,983 -1.6 937 3.89 
10/06/2014 13,671 -1.9 774 3.80 
11/06/2014 14,189 -1.5 1099 4.97 
12/06/2014 15,126 -2.4 380 1.50 
13/06/2014 14,172 -2.2 511 2.56 
16/06/2014 16,818 -2.5 373 1.49 
17/06/2014 14,767 -1.8 905 3.89 
18/06/2014 13,120 -1.7 897 3.90 
19/06/2014 13,888 -1.7 1000 4.90 
20/06/2014 12,119 -1.5 1507 4.99 
23/06/2014 14,662 -1.6 1015 4.92 
24/06/2014 13,000 -2.3 571 3.66 
25/06/2014 12,981 -2.2 638 3.63 
26/06/2014 15,126 -2.1 777 2.01 
27/06/2014 14,220 -1.7 923 3.88 
30/06/2014 14,003 -1.5 1609 4.96 
                                                                                   Aggressive HFTrs  
02/06/2014 6,771 3.9 0 1.23 
03/06/2014 5,877 4.2 0 1.20 
04/06/2014 3,266 4.0 0 1.28 
05/06/2014 3,115 2.7 0 1.34 
06/06/2014 2,107 2.9 0 1.33 
09/06/2014 6,270 3.1 0 0.89 
10/06/2014 6,145 3.2 0 1.03 
11/06/2014 5,001 2.5 0 0.49 
12/06/2014 3,999 2.8 0 1.77 
13/06/2014 4,148 3.0 0 1.49 
16/06/2014 2,288 5.2 0 0.78 
17/06/2014 4,115 3.3 0 1.30 
18/06/2014 5,772 1.9 0 1.76 
19/06/2014 5,509 2.4 0 1.29 
20/06/2014 6,004 3.7 0 2.25 
23/06/2014 4,778 2.1 0 2.24 
24/06/2014 6,717 1.8 0 1.22 
25/06/2014 6,992 3.5 0 2.38 
26/06/2014 4,116 2.6 0 1.44 
27/06/2014 5,124 2.0 0 2.41 
30/06/2014 5,233 2.3 0 1.39 
This table presents the trading volume, the latency, the number of latency opportunities and the Herfindahl index for Intel from 2nd of June, 
2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated by STGP.  
* We estimate the actual latency magnitude between the two groups of artificial high frequency traders and NASDAQ NBBO using the 
following equations: 
             ( , )HFTscalpers HFTscalpers i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                           
           ( , )aggressiveHFTrs aggressiveHFTrs i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                    
Negative latency values indicates that HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO faster than NASDAQ SIP. 
Table 4. Statistical measures for Intel from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated by HFT 
scalpers and aggressive HFTrs.  
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                                                                                      HFT scalpers 
Date Trading volume Latency* Number of latency 
arbitrage 
opportunities 
Herfindahl index for 
NASDAQ NBBO 
02/06/2014 14,237 -1.9 781 3.82 
03/06/2014 15,944 -1.9 779 3.81 
04/06/2014 15,161 -2.1 733 3.69 
05/06/2014 16,120 -1.7 845 2.70 
06/06/2014 14,266 -1.5 1500 4.99 
09/06/2014 13,353 -1.5 1514 4.98 
10/06/2014 12,348 -1.7 874 3.71 
11/06/2014 14,003 -1.8 912 3.63 
12/06/2014 16,272 -2.7 327 2.55 
13/06/2014 16,400 -2.5 410 2.59 
16/06/2014 13,445 -2.8 306 1.54 
17/06/2014 14,894 -2.0 732 3.78 
18/06/2014 14,122 -2.1 719 3.63 
19/06/2014 13,009 -2.5 403 2.59 
20/06/2014 12,474 -1.8 838 3.62 
23/06/2014 11,277 -1.9 700 2.88 
24/06/2014 14,820 -1.5 1508 4.94 
25/06/2014 13,995 -1.7 936 4.90 
26/06/2014 13,823 -2.1 699 2.53 
27/06/2014 14,237 -2.2 642 2.61 
30/06/2014 14,336 -2.0 863 3.77 
                                                                                   Aggressive HFTrs  
02/06/2014 4,002 2.6 0 1.33 
03/06/2014 3,888 3.1 0 1.29 
04/06/2014 3,997 3.4 0 1.26 
05/06/2014 3,555 3.0 0 0.93 
06/06/2014 4,111 2.7 0 0.99 
09/06/2014 5,373 2.9 0 1.30 
10/06/2014 6,661 2.3 0 1.35 
11/06/2014 5,822 2.0 0 2.36 
12/06/2014 3,119 3.7 0 2.27 
13/06/2014 3,005 3.5 0 1.28 
16/06/2014 5,474 2.8 0 1.32 
17/06/2014 4,585 2.6 0 1.34 
18/06/2014 4,778 2.2 0 2.29 
19/06/2014 5,116 2.1 0 1.33 
20/06/2014 6,828 2.1 0 1.30 
23/06/2014 7,080 1.9 0 2.41 
24/06/2014 4,821 2.5 0 1.28 
25/06/2014 5,112 2.4 0 1.27 
26/06/2014 5,228 2.5 0 1.34 
27/06/2014 4,999 2.3 0 1.35 
30/06/2014 5,021 2.5 0 0.87 
This table presents the trading volume, the latency, the number of latency opportunities and the Herfindahl index for Microsoft from 2nd of 
June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated by STGP.  
* We measure the latency by estimating the amount of time between the HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs time stamps at SIP and the 
NBBO as follows: 
             ( , )HFTscalpers HFTscalpers i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                           
           ( , )aggressiveHFTrs aggressiveHFTrs i t NBBOLatency Timestamp Timestamp                    
Negative latency values indicates that HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs are able to calculate NASDAQ NBBO faster than NASDAQ SIP. 
Table 5. Statistical measures for Microsoft from 2nd of June, 2014 to 30th of June, 2014 generated by 
HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs.  
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                                                                                       Cisco Systems 
Statistical measure Log (price) Log (trading 
volume)  
Volatility Herfindahl index 
Log (number of 
latency arbitrage 
opportunities) 
1.75* 0.52* 21.36** -3.27** 
                                                                                              Intel  
Log (number of 
latency arbitrage 
opportunities) 
1.36** 0.61* 17.88** -2.91** 
                                                                                         Microsoft  
Log (number of 
latency arbitrage 
opportunities) 
1.93** 0.66* 15.91** -3.01** 
7KLVWDEOHVKRZVWKHVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHEHWZHHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶YDULDEOHV generated by STGP from 2nd of June, 2014 to 3oth of June, 
2014. Regressions are performed for each measure of the number of latency opportunities for each independent variable, and therefore the 
table reports coefficients for 12 regressions in total. Each regression accommodate security fixed effects. Volatility is measured as 
SHUFHQWDJHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHGD\¶VKLJKHVWDQGORZHVWSULFHVStatistical significance has been calculated controlling for 
heteroskedasticity: 
 Number of latency arbitrage opportunities
 i,t = , ,i i t i txD E H  , 
where  number of latency opportunities i,t measures the latency opportunities for security i on day t , iD represents the fixed security effect 
and 
,i tx is the characteristic for security i on day t. 
*Indicates statistical significance at 0.99 level. **Indicates statistical significance at 0.95 level.  
Table 6. &RUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶YDULDEOHVJHQHUDWHGE\67*3IRUPnd of June, 2014 to 
30th of June, 2014.  
Dependent variable Change in quote midpoint prices Change in quoted depth 
1
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.028* 0.041** 
1
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.021** 0.019** 
1
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.062* 0.010* 
1
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.024* 0.007* 
1
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.038** 0.006* 
2
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.309* 0.526** 
2
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.275* 0.490** 
2
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.415** 0.317** 
2
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.188** 0.479* 
2
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.204** 0.233** 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.39 
This table consist of pooled, fixed effects, regressions for Cisco Systems estimated by jointly examining the relationship between the change 
in the number of price updates segmented by the relative proximity to the best posted quotes on subsequent changes in quote midpoint prices 
and quoted depth for the stock. We estimate the following model for the two dependent variables such as change in quote midpoints and 
quoted depth:  
5 5
1 2
0 , , ,
1 1
it k i t k k i t k i t it it
k k
Y Numpriceupdates Numpriceupdates XD D E J H 
  
'  '  '  ¦ ¦    
 where 
itY' measure changes in quote midpoint prices and quoted depth regressed on changes to price message updates at the inside and 
the first price away from the inside quote for stock i at time t , 1
,i t kNumpriceupdates ' and 2 ,i t kNumpriceupdates '
represent changes in the number of price updates at the inside quoted prices and the first and second price levels relative to the inside quotes, 
X consists of a set of control variables including 10 lags of each of the two dependent variables; five periods of lagged volume; five lags 
of each of bid and ask quote changes as well as bid and ask depth changes; and time dummy variables. All coefficients in the table have 
been multiplied by 10.  *Indicates statistical significance at 0.99 level. **Indicates statistical significance at 0.95 level.  
Table 7. The relationship betweHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity and NASDAQ NBBO for 
Cisco Systems.  
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Dependent variable Change in quote midpoint prices Change in quoted depth 
1
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.019** 0.057* 
1
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.012** 0.049* 
1
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.044** 0.035* 
1
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.035* 0.018** 
1
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.030** 0.009** 
2
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.411** 0.403* 
2
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.236** 0.448* 
2
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.115* 0.399* 
2
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.253** 0.476* 
2
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.286** 0.290** 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.27 
This table consist of pooled, fixed effects, regressions for Intel estimated by jointly examining the relationship between the change in the 
number of price updates segmented by the relative proximity to the best posted quotes on subsequent changes in quote midpoint prices and 
quoted depth for the stock. We estimate the following model for the two dependent variables such as change in quote midpoints and quoted 
depth: 5 5
1 2
0 , , ,
1 1
it k i t k k i t k i t it it
k k
Y Numpriceupdates Numpriceupdates XD D E J H 
  
'  '  '  ¦ ¦    
 where 
itY' measure changes in quote midpoint prices and quoted depth regressed on changes to price message updates at the inside and 
the first price away from the inside quote for stock i at time t , 1
,i t kNumpriceupdates ' and 2 ,i t kNumpriceupdates '
represent changes in the number of price updates at the inside quoted prices and the first and second price levels relative to the inside quotes, 
X consists of a set of control variables including 10 lags of each of the two dependent variables; five periods of lagged volume; five lags 
of each of bid and ask quote changes as well as bid and ask depth changes; and time dummy variables. All coefficients in the table have 
been multiplied by 10.  *Indicates statistical significance at 0.99 level. **Indicates statistical significance at 0.95 level.  
Table 8. The relationshLSEHWZHHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity and NASDAQ NBBO for Intel. 
Dependent variable Change in quote midpoint prices Change in quoted depth 
1
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.020* 0.074** 
1
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.013* 0.048* 
1
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.032** 0.033* 
1
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.031** 0.015** 
1
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.045** 0.0010* 
2
1tNumpriceupdates '  0.119* 0.447* 
2
2tNumpriceupdates '  0.203** 0.406* 
2
3tNumpriceupdates '  0.284** 0.428** 
2
4tNumpriceupdates '  0.267** 0.399** 
2
5tNumpriceupdates '  0.217* 0.306** 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.49 
This table consist of pooled, fixed effects, regressions for Microsoft estimated by jointly examining the relationship between the change in 
the number of price updates segmented by the relative proximity to the best posted quotes on subsequent changes in quote midpoint prices 
and quoted depth for the stock. We estimate the following model for the two dependent variables such as change in quote midpoints and 
quoted depth: 5 5
1 2
0 , , ,
1 1
it k i t k k i t k i t it it
k k
Y Numpriceupdates Numpriceupdates XD D E J H 
  
'  '  '  ¦ ¦    
 where 
itY' measure changes in quote midpoint prices and quoted depth regressed on changes to price message updates at the inside and 
the first price away from the inside quote for stock i at time t , 1
,i t kNumpriceupdates ' and 2 ,i t kNumpriceupdates '
represent changes in the number of price updates at the inside quoted prices and the first and second price levels relative to the inside quotes, 
X consists of a set of control variables including 10 lags of each of the two dependent variables; five periods of lagged volume; five lags 
of each of bid and ask quote changes as well as bid and ask depth changes; and time dummy variables. All coefficients in the table have 
been multiplied by 10. *Indicates statistical significance at 0.99 level. **Indicates statistical significance at 0.95 level.  
Table 9. The relationship betweHQ+)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity and NASDAQ NBBO for Microsoft. 
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                                                                                                       Cisco Systems 
Date Trading volume (shares)* Average price difference** Profits 
02/06/2014 20,347 0.0161 $327.59 
03/06/2014 19,009 0.0161 $306.04 
04/06/2014 19,822 0.0161 $319.13 
05/06/2014 18,251 0.0161 $293.84 
06/06/2014 18,111 0.0161 $291.59 
09/06/2014 15,983 0.0161 $257.33 
10/06/2014 22,575 0.0161 $363.45 
11/06/2014 20,262 0.0161 $326.22 
12/06/2014 19,999 0.0161 $321.98 
13/06/2014 19,634 0.0161 $316.10 
16/06/2014 19,120 0.0161 $307.83 
17/06/2014 17,845 0.0161 $287.30 
18/06/2014 23,727 0.0161 $382.00 
19/06/2014 16,891 0.0161 $271.94 
20/06/2014 18,776 0.0161 $302.29 
23/06/2014 20,292 0.0161 $326.70 
24/06/2014 19,890 0.0161 $320.22 
25/06/2014 18,276 0.0161 $294.24 
26/06/2014 18,393 0.0161 $296.12 
27/06/2014 20,818 0.0161 $335.17 
30/06/2014 20,164 0.0161 $324.64 
                                                                                                            Intel 
02/06/2014 13,237 0.0067 $88.69 
03/06/2014 14,002 0.0067 $93.81 
04/06/2014 15,265 0.0067 $102.27 
05/06/2014 15,789 0.0067 $105.79 
06/06/2014 16,489 0.0067 $110.48 
09/06/2014 12,983 0.0067 $86.99 
10/06/2014 13,671 0.0067 $91.59 
11/06/2014 14,189 0.0067 $95.07 
12/06/2014 15,126 0.0067 $101.34 
13/06/2014 14,172 0.0067 $94.95 
16/06/2014 16,818 0.0067 $112.68 
17/06/2014 14,767 0.0067 $98.94 
18/06/2014 13,120 0.0067 $87.90 
19/06/2014 13,888 0.0067 $93.05 
20/06/2014 12,119 0.0067 $81.20 
23/06/2014 14,662 0.0067 $98.23 
24/06/2014 13,000 0.0067 $87.10 
25/06/2014 12,981 0.0067 $86.98 
26/06/2014 15,126 0.0067 $101.34 
27/06/2014 14,220 0.0067 $95.27 
30/06/2014 14,003 0.0067 $93.82 
                                                                                                       Microsoft 
02/06/2014 14,237 0.0043 $61.22 
03/06/2014 15,994 0.0043 $68.56 
04/06/2014 15,161 0.0043 $65.19 
05/06/2014 16,120 0.0043 $69.32 
06/06/2014 14,266 0.0043 $61.34 
09/06/2014 13,353 0.0043 $57.42 
10/06/2014 12,348 0.0043 $53.10 
11/06/2014 14,003 0.0043 $60.21 
12/06/2014 16,272 0.0043 $69.97 
13/06/2014 16,400 0.0043 $70.52 
16/06/2014 13,445 0.0043 $57.81 
17/06/2014 14,894 0.0043 $64.04 
18/06/2014 14,122 0.0043 $60.72 
19/06/2014 13,009 0.0043 $55.94 
20/06/2014 12,474 0.0043 $53.63 
23/06/2014 11,277 0.0043 $48.49 
24/06/2014 14,820 0.0043 $63.73 
25/06/2014 13,995 0.0043 $60.18 
26/06/2014 13,823 0.0043 $59.44 
27/06/2014 14,237 0.0043 $61.22 
30/06/2014 14,336 0.0043 $61.64 
*All trading volumes are generated by artificial stock market traders during real-time trading. **Measures the average price difference 
between NASDAQ SIP and NASDAQ NBBO after transaction costs of $0.004 per share.   
                       Table 10. +)7VFDOSHUV¶SURILWDELOLW\for Cisco Systems, Intel and Microsoft.  
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                                                                                                    Cisco Systems                
Date Trading volume 
(shares)* 
Number of latency 
arbitrage opportunities 
Latency Cost of latency 
arbitrage** 
02/06/2014 20,347 1,094 1.6 $0.15 
03/06/2014 19,009 1,502 1.5 $0.18 
04/06/2014 19,822 1,500 1.5 $0.19 
05/06/2014 18,251 912 1.8 $0.13 
06/06/2014 18,111 1,000 1.6 $0.12 
09/06/2014 15,983 803 1.9 $0.10 
10/06/2014 22,575 678 2.0 $0.13 
11/06/2014 20,262 610 2.1 $0.11 
12/06/2014 19,999 608 2.1 $0.11 
13/06/2014 19,634 699 2.0 $0.12 
16/06/2014 19,120 517 2.2 $0.09 
17/06/2014 17,845 900 1.8 $0.12 
18/06/2014 23,727 1,036 1.6 $0.16 
19/06/2014 16,891 1,001 1.7 $0.12 
20/06/2014 18,776 690 2.0 $0.11 
23/06/2014 20,292 477 2.4 $0.10 
24/06/2014 19,890 1,511 1.5 $0.19 
25/06/2014 18,276 1,029 1.6 $0.13 
26/06/2014 18,393 1,517 1.5 $0.18 
27/06/2014 20,818 800 1.9 $0.13 
30/06/2014 20,164 911 1.8 $0.14 
                                                                                                            Intel 
02/06/2014 13,237 619 2.0 $0.04 
03/06/2014 14,002 778 1.9 $0.05 
04/06/2014 15,265 501 2.2 $0.04 
05/06/2014 15,789 388 2.5 $0.03 
06/06/2014 16,489 723 1.9 $0.05 
09/06/2014 12,983 937 1.6 $0.04 
10/06/2014 13,671 774 1.9 $0.04 
11/06/2014 14,189 1,099 1.5 $0.05 
12/06/2014 15,126 380 2.4 $0.03 
13/06/2014 14,172 511 2.2 $0.04 
16/06/2014 16,818 373 2.5 $0.03 
17/06/2014 14,767 905 1.8 $0.05 
18/06/2014 13,120 897 1.7 $0.04 
19/06/2014 13,888 1,000 1.7 $0.05 
20/06/2014 12,119 1,507 1.5 $0.06 
23/06/2014 14,662 1,015 1.6 $0.05 
24/06/2014 13,000 571 2.3 $0.04 
25/06/2014 12,981 638 2.2 $0.04 
26/06/2014 15,126 777 2.1 $0.06 
27/06/2014 14,220 923 1.7 $0.05 
30/06/2014 14,003 1,609 1.5 $0.08 
                                                                                                        Microsoft 
02/06/2014 14,237 781 1.9 $0.04 
03/06/2014 15,944 779 1.9 $0.04 
04/06/2014 15,161 733 2.1 $0.04 
05/06/2014 16,120 845 1.7 $0.04 
06/06/2014 14,266 1,500 1.5 $0.06 
09/06/2014 13,353 1,514 1.5 $0.05 
10/06/2014 12,348 874 1.7 $0.03 
11/06/2014 14,003 912 1.8 $0.04 
12/06/2014 16,272 327 2.7 $0.02 
13/06/2014 16,400 410 2.5 $0.03 
16/06/2014 13,445 306 2.8 $0.02 
17/06/2014 14,894 732 2.0 $0.04 
18/06/2014 14,122 719 2.1 $0.04 
19/06/2014 13,009 403 2.5 $0.02 
20/06/2014 12,474 838 1.8 $0.03 
23/06/2014 11,277 700 1.9 $0.03 
24/06/2014 14,820 1,508 1.5 $0.06 
25/06/2014 13,995 936 1.7 $0.04 
26/06/2014 13,823 699 2.1 $0.03 
27/06/2014 14,237 642 2.2 $0.03 
30/06/2014 14,336 863 2.0 $0.04 
*All trading volumes are generated by artificial stock market traders during real-time trading. **Measure the cost of +)7VFDOSHUV¶latency 
arbitrage on institutional traders within artificial stock market settings.   
                                       Table 11. Estimated cost of +)7VFDOSHUV¶ latency arbitrage on institutional traders.  
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Type HFTscalperst-1 MQt-1 
HFTscalpers 0.208* 0.549* 
HP ± LP  0.003* 0.225* 
 
HFTscalpers 0.471* 0.079 
The effective spread 0.002* -0.003 
 
HFTscalpers 0.211* 0.023* 
High ± Low  0.647* 0.170* 
 
HFTscalpers 0.199* 0.363* 
Depth -0.168* -0.118* 
The table reports the results of the bivariate VAR model: 
5 5
, , , ,
1 1
i t i i i t k k i t k i t
k k
HFTscalpers a b MQ c HFTscalpers H 
  
   ¦ ¦
 
5 5
, , , ,
1 1
i t i i i t k k i t k i t
k k
MQ MQ HFTscalpersD E J H 
  
   ¦ ¦
 
There are four different measures of market quality ± two of them are related to short ± term volatility (HP ± LP and High ± Low) and the 
other two are related to liquidity (The effective spread and Depth). HP ± LP has been estimated as the highest price of the three financial 
instruments minus the lowest price divided by the midpoint of the highest price and the lowest price in the sample period (02/01/2014 ± 
30/06/2014). High ± Low has been calculated as the highest mid ± quote minus the lowest mid ± quote. The effective spread is measured as 
((best ask price ± best bid price) / (bestask ± bestbid) / 2) in the sample period. Depth represents the time ± weighted average of the number 
of traders in the book at the best posted prices. *indicates significance at 0.99% level.  
Table 12. +)7VFDOSHUV¶ODWHQF\DUELWUDJH activity generated by STGP trading algorithm for Cisco 
Systems, Intel and Microsoft and its implications on market quality.  
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                                                  Appendix A 
 
                                                                   Genetic Programming  
 
The process of Genetic Programming (GP) is divided into two sub-processes: the first is the initialisation 
process which generates an initial population of trading rules in a random manner, while the other sub-process is 
the dynamics process which works in a similar way to Genetic Algorithms (GA). Both GA and GP comply with 
the rules of Darwinian selection, crossover and mutation. However, there is a significant difference between GA 
and GP where the GA population is composed of fixed-length binary strings and the population of GP is 
composed of trading rules. Each trading rule in GP is written in LISP S-Expression and represented by a parse 
tree. By determining both the terminal and the functional sets, each trading rule can be written in LISP S-
Expression such as:  
 
 
 
(10) 
 
where the terminal set is represented by , where  is a constant; is the functional set 
and therefore the parse tree for this particular S-expression can be represented as follows: 
                                                         
Figure 1. Parse tree representation of logistic map  
 
Every crossover operation in GP begins with the random selection of two parse trees to act as parents. 
Consequently, two offspring are produced by exchanging specific parts of the two selected parents. The 
exchange process begins with the random and independent selection of one point in each parental parse tree by 
applying a uniform distribution. The syntax of LISP suggests that each point of the parse tree could be either a 
terminal (leaf) or a function (root).  
 
Therefore, the selected point could either be in the form of a terminal or a function. The probability that the 
crossover point is a terminal or a function is the same through time of one-half. Given that a terminal or a 
function is to be the selected point for crossover, the actual probability that any terminal or function is chosen as 
the crossover point is uniformly distributed. For example, when the terminal is to be selected to act as a 
crossover point, there are three terminals located within the parse tree.  The probability is one-third that any of 
the three terminals will be chosen for the crossover operation. The process of mutation in GP allows one to 
develop new artificial traders. Usually, mutation begins with the selection of a parse tree from HFT scalpers and 
aggressive HFTrs. Then each selected point can randomly change value within the same population of traders. 
At the same time, each point has a very small probability of being altered by mutation, which is independent of 
other points (Chen and Yeh 1997).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 4 1t xt tX X  
 , tR X R    *4 * 1t tX X
 1 4 1t xt tX X  
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                                                      Appendix B 
 
                                        Strongly Typed Genetic Programming  
Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) is a of GP whose application of generic functions and data types 
makes it more sophisticated than GP. GP represents a machine-learning method to automate the development of 
computer programs in terms of natural evolution (Banzhaf et al., 1998). If there are inputs and outputs , a 
program is generated which satisfies . In nearly all GP models, the programs are organised as 
tree genomes. For example, Figure 2 shows a tree which describes a mathematical expression using the input 
variables where . The leaf nodes of the tree in Figure 2 are known as terminals, whereas 
the non-leaf nodes are non-terminals. Terminals are usually inputs to the program with no argument and the 
non-terminals are functions often represented with at least one argument.  
 
 
Figure 2. STGP program tree genomes (copied from Wappler and Wegener, 2006).  
 
In our experiment, the parse trees represent the trading rules of both HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs. The 
typical genetic structure of the trading rule consists of hundreds of nodes and is rather unwieldy to actually write 
out, however, it can be simplified to equivalent algorithmic trading rules, as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of trading rule for aggressive HFTrs.   
 
Figure 3 illustrates that the trading rule for aggressive HFTrs sends a buy signal if the average stock price over 
the past 1 millisecond is greater than the current price. A sell signal is sent otherwise.  
 
Figure 4. Example of trading rule for HFt scalpers. 
 
Figure 4 indicates that the trading rule of HFT scalpers sends a buy signal if the average stock price over the 
past 1 millisecond is greater than the current price and the current volume is less than 500. A sell signal is sent 
otherwise. The current volume function protects HFT scalpers from sweep risk exposure. Large losses caused by 
X Y
p  Y p X 
( , , )x a b c x X
 40 | P a g e  
 
VZHHSV DGYHUVHSULFH PRYHPHQWVDJDLQVW+)7VFDOSHUV¶ WUDQVLHQWSRVLWLRQVFDQVXEVWDQWLDOO\ UHGXFHRUHYHQ
eliminate their profitability, so the management of sweep risk is of paramount importance for HFT scalpers.  
HFT scalpers use the market microstructure to capture and avoid sweep risk, which is the risk related to trading 
against large informed toxic orders (for instance, large institutional orders) positioned at multiple levels of the 
order book.  
 
 
The fitness function of trading rules of 50,000 HFT scalpers and 50,000 aggressive HFTrs are based on its 
ability to satisfy  . If is the expected known output and  the actual output generated by a 
program with , the fitness function of  has been calculated as: 
 
 
 
(11) 
 
Usually the nodes of the GP tree are not typed as Montana (2002) argues that many GP procedures can be 
formulated in a more efficient programming way by implementing a typing mechanism for GP nodes. In this 
way each node is connected to a particular return type and the process is known as Strongly Typed Genetic 
Programming (STGP). To create a parse tree one needs to take into account important additional programming 
criteria such as when the root node of the tree returns a value of the type required by the problem and when each 
non-root node returns a value of the type required by the parent node as an argument (Montana, 2002). While 
GP can be written in any programming language, the STGP is typically written in a specific programming 
language, which is a combination of Ada (Barnes, 1982) and Lisp (Steele, 1984). The concept of generics as a 
method of developing strongly typed data is the critical component adopted from Ada.  Additionally, Lisp 
incorporates the concept of having programs represented by their actual parse trees (Montana, 1995).  
 
In conventional GP, one needs to specify all the programs and variables that can be used as nodes in a parse tree 
and deal with the search space of the order of 1030 - 1040.  STGP however reduces the searching state-space size 
to a greater degree (Montana, 1994). On the other hand, the STGP search space composes the set of all legal 
parse trees, which means that all functions have the correct number of parameters of the correct type. On most 
occasions, the STGP parse tree is limited to a certain maximum depth (Table 1 illustrates that 20 is the 
maximum depth in the three artificial stock markets in this study). We set the maximum depth to 20 in order to 
keep the search space finite and manageable, while not allowing the trees to grow to an extremely large size. 
The critical concepts in STGP are generic functions (a mechanism for specifying a class of functions), and the 
process of assigning generic data types for these functions (Haynes et al., 1995).  
 
STGP has the flexibility to allow all variables, constraints, arguments and returned values to be of any type. The 
only strict requirement is that the type of data for each element has to be specified during the early stage of the 
programming process. The resulting initialisation process and the various genetic operators associated with it are 
enabled to create syntactically correct trees. Those trees on the other hand are beneficial to the entire 
programming process because the search space can be significantly reduced (Haynes et al., 1996).  
 
The STGP generates trading rules through the crossover and mutation operators. During the process of 
crossover, the return value type of the two selected subtrees for the exchange are examined to find out whether 
they are from the same type and that the resulting trees are not breaching depth restrictions. In the case that 
either check fails, then two completely new subtrees are selected. If, after performing a finite number of 
selections, there are no valid crossover points, then the two parent trees are copied and transferred into the pool 
for the next generation (Koza, 1992).  
 
STGP trading rules for the HFT scalpers and aggressive HFTrs can be described through the following 
crossover process. Similar to GP, randomly chosen parts of two trading rules are exchanged in order to create 
two new trading rules (Figure 3).  
( )Y p X expY PY
p ( )pY p X ( )f p p
  2exp
1
( )
i
X
i
i
f p p x y
 
 ¦
 41 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The process of crossover in STGP for generating new trading rules (copied from Chakraborti et al., 
2011).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates that the trading strategies and are the two parents. The breaking point is based on 
random choice and then one-point crossover is applied to create new trading rules (children) and .  
The first generation of trading rules is created randomly to ensure that a large variety of possible trading rules is 
investigated at full capacity. The best performing trading rules from the initial selection are selected based on 
the Breeding Fitness Return to act as parents in the crossover process. The Breeding Fitness Return process 
represents a trailing return of a wealth moving average and is an integral part of the latency of HFT scalpers. 
This is in fact the return over the last TXRWHVRIDQH[SRQHQWLDOPRYLQJDYHUDJHRIDWUDGHU¶VZHDOWKZKHUH
could potentially have the maximum breeding value of 250. Each pair of parents generates two offspring trading 
rules, making the number of parents and the number of offspring equal at all times.  
 
In this innovative programming process, the newly created trading rules replace those that are performing poorly 
in the initial selection based on the Replacement Fitness Return. This type of return represents the average 
return of a wealth moving average per millisecond quote since the creation of the very first trading rule. In other 
words, this is the cumulatiYH UHWXUQ RI DQ H[SRQHQWLDO PRYLQJ DYHUDJH RI D WUDGHU¶V ZHDOWK GLYLGHG E\ WKH
WUDGHU¶VEUHHGLQJYDOXH 
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